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THE EASTERN CAMPAIGNS
OF
ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT

by

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A THESIS

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P R E F A C E

The object of this study is to illuminate the events preceding, during, and resulting from that campaign which won for Antiochus III, King of Syria, the title "Great". In narrating this campaign, I have attempted to show that this eastern expedition was more than just one of reconquest. It was as well a foray for the purpose of replenishing the army with elephants and replenishing the royal treasury with gold.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- AJA -- American Journal of Archaeology
- JHS -- Journal of Hellenic Studies
- HCD -- Harpers' Classical Dictionary
- Hist. -- Livy, From the Founding of the City
- CAH -- Cambridge Ancient History
- Hel. His. -- Botsford, Hellenic History
- His. of the Gr. World -- Cary, A History of the Greek World
- Heritage -- Frye, The Heritage of Persia
- Attalids -- Hansen, The Attalids of Pergamum
- Comp. His. of Ind. -- Nilikanti Sastri, A Comprehensive
History of India
- Gr. Mercenary Soldiers -- Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers
- SGM -- Rawlinson, The Seven Great Monarchies of the Ancient
Eastern World
- SEH -- Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the
Hellenistic World
- H. of I. -- Smith, The Early History of India
- Gks. in B. and I. -- Tarn, The Greeks in Bactria and India
- Hel. Civ. -- Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization

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CHAPTER I

THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER AND THE BREAKUP OF HIS EMPIRE

In Bablyon, Alexander was dead. His passing caused great and wide-spread confusion throughout the Hellenic world but especially in this city wherein lay the camp of his great army. The power of Alexander had rested almost entirely on the army. The army knew this and "felt itself one with its great leader."¹ Therefore, this force felt that the choice of a successor was its prerogative alone and not that of any force which might be stationed at home in Macedon.² Roxane, Alexander's Iranian wife, was expecting a child, and the support of Perdikkas, the commander-in-chief of the army, was for the unborn child, should it be male. The higher aristocracy, the Macedonian gentry, the cavalry, and the officers, like Perdikkas loyal to Alexander's concept of an Irano-Macedonian empire, were also in favor of the unborn child. The phalanx, however, did not share in this concept. Instead they preferred a son of Philip's house, a pure-blooded Macedonian. Thus a conflict arose which was settled by compromise. Should the dead king's child be male, he would rule as co-regent with Alexander's half-brother Arrhidaeus.³ By this settlement, therefore:

-
1. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 3
 2. Note that Macedonian monarchs were chosen by the Macedonian people in arms.
 3. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 3

the unity of the empire was preserved, but only nominally. In fact it was divided among the generals of Alexander (by the distribution among them of the satrapies) and it was evident that most of the generals were not prepared to obey the orders of those who would act in the name of the king if they were strong enough to support by force of arms their claim to practical independence.⁴

There were some who wished to see the unity of the empire maintained, but

The majority of the satraps, . . . , had at least at the beginning of the struggle, no definite ideas regarding their relations with the empire as a whole. They tried to keep their satrapies in their own hands, and to share their power and their resources as little as possible with anyone else.⁵

Thus a picture is drawn of Alexander's generals, who not long before had together conquered the world, now eying one another like hungry lynx. The actual struggles for power are extremely involved and have no place here. Let it suffice to say that after a half-century or so of constant conflict, the Hellenistic kingdoms of the Antigonids, the Ptolemies and the Seleucids took shape, and

the idea of separate and independent . . . kingdoms and of a certain balance of power between them took firm root.⁶

4. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 3

5. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 5

6. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 23

CHAPTER II

AN OUTLINE OF SELEUCID AFFAIRS 245-223 B.C.

In the years preceding the anabasis of Antiochus, the three principal Hellenistic monarchs carried on their struggles with one another pretty much as they had been doing for the half-century following the death of Alexander, oblivious of the newly emerging giant in the west who would soon make his presence felt. At this time¹, however, Rome was preoccupied in a great struggle with Carthage and Carthage's nominal ally, Macedon, for the control of the western Mediterranean world, a conflict in which the Seleucids played no part.

At this point it might be judicious to say a few words concerning the rest of the Mediterranean world during this period. In Greece, Athens was no longer a power of any magnitude but was important as the centre of Hellenism². Sparta too was declining and although two of her kings Agis IV and Cleomenes III attempted to restore her to her former greatness, they failed, and Sparta was in the end taken over by the Achaean League.³ During this period, the third century before Christ, the political powers in Greece were the Achaean League and the Aetolian League. The Aetolian League by 279 B.C.

had evolved from a loose federation of rural Aetolian villages to a federal union of cities comprising all of central Greece except Athens and some of Thessaly.

1. 264-201 B.C.

2. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 2, p. 612

3. Trevelyan, History of Ancient Civilization, Vol. 1, p. 477

The Achaean League was also a federal league which had been, until the middle of the third century, an ethnic group of Achaean towns in the northern Peloponnese.⁴

Further east, Rhodes at this time was avoiding the grandiose schemes of the Hellenistic monarchs, and having gained her independence just after the death of Alexander, was achieving great prestige "by energetic interference against all who threatened the balance of power or the security of the seas."⁵ In following this policy she waged

some vigorous campaigns against Byzantine, Pergamene and Pontic kings, who threatened the Black Sea trade route . . . , and against the pirates of Crete.⁶

In the pursuit of this policy she also supported Rome against Philip V and Antiochus III.

In the Black Sea region, Cappadocia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia and Pontus had gained their independence from their Macedonian overlords⁷ and were not as yet powers of any importance. Pontus would later become a power to be reckoned with under the aegis of Mithridates VI Eupator. The Pergamenes during this period under discussion, were in the process of making theirs an independent state. More will be said of them in the following narrative. This, then, is a brief summary of the smaller states during the third century.

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- 4. Trever, History of Ancient Civilization, Vol. 1, p. 477
 - 5. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 19, p. 236 - s.v. "Rhodes"
 - 6. Ibid
 - 7. vid. infra p. 18

Turning back now to the affairs of the Seleucids we find that externally the Syrian monarchy was keeping itself occupied in a duel with the Ptolemies over Coele-Syria⁸ in a series of wars which are known to history as the Syrian Wars.⁹ These wars are in themselves irrelevant to this topic but are, to a great extent, responsible for the success of the rebellions in the eastern provinces of the Seleucid Empire; for because of these wars the Seleucid monarchs had neither the time nor the inclination for governing and protecting their outlying domains.

In or around 253¹⁰ Ptolemy II had persuaded Antiochus II to put aside his rightful wife Laodice and marry Ptolemy's daughter, Bernice, on the understanding that in return for a dowry which soon became proverbial for vast wealth, the children of this second union would inherit the Seleucid domains. Upon the death of Antiochus, sometime "between October 247 and April 246",¹¹ conflict arose between the two dowager queens. At this time, January 246, Ptolemy II

8. Although the name Coelesyria (Hollow Syria) is sometimes extended so as to include even the coast of the Mediterranean . . . from Seleucia to Egypt and Arabia . . . , and especially the prolongation of the southern valley along the crevasse of the Jordan to the Dead Sea . . . , yet, according to Strabo, the name properly describes the valley between Libanus and Antilibanus, (xvi. 2.21),

Wm. Smith, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography
Vol. 2, p. 1071

9. For Syrian Wars see CAH 7, pp. 699-731

10. CAH 7, p. 715

11. Ibid.

also died and was succeeded by his son Ptolemy III Euergetes.¹² Meanwhile, in Syria, Laodice's faction had gained the upper hand; Bernice and her son being killed sometime in the spring of 246. In this same spring Ptolemy started marching north towards Antioch meeting very little resistance in Syria, for the death of Bernice and her son had been kept a secret, and as a result no one was sure who was the rightful monarch. Thus Ptolemy marched not as a conquering foreigner but as a champion of the rightful heir, that is, the son of Antiochus II and Bernice, against Seleucus II.¹³

In this war, popularly known as the Laodicean War, young Ptolemy carried all before him.

His own record of his campaign claims that he had conquered all Asia up to the borders of Bactria; Egyptian scribes subsequently added Armenia, Thrace, and Macedonia . . . by Jerome's time he had frankly conquered almost all Asia¹⁴

What he undoubtedly did do was go to Seleucia-on-the Tigris and receive the adhesion of the generals of the eastern satrapies by sending them letters in Bernice's name. He appointed a general over the eastern satrapies and went home again with his plunder¹⁵

Ptolemy's own account records that he was recalled to Egypt due to an uprising in the Delta and it is possible that once the concealment of the death of Bernice broke down, this was an expedient excuse.¹⁶ Rostovtzeff thinks that Seleucus

12. CAH 7, p. 716

13. Ibid. p. 717

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

mounted a counter-offensive in Syria thus forcing Euergetes to retreat.¹⁷ Either one or both explanations could easily be correct.

After Euergetes had withdrawn, the Seleucids reconquered by 241 with ease those areas overrun by the Ptolemaic forces.¹⁸ Syria, however,

was less formidable than she had been previously, her hold over her outlying dominions was relaxed, her strength was crippled, her prestige lost, and her honor tarnished.¹⁹

The Ptolemaic conquest, probably more than anything else, gave heart and strength to the newly-rebelled satraps of Parthia and Bactria.

Besides having external problems, the Seleucid monarchs were plagued with internal troubles. Sometime during the struggle with Euergetes (probably in 245 B.C.) Seleucus II had granted to his younger brother Antiochus, nicknamed Hierax (Hawk), all of Asia Minor north of the Taurus.²⁰ Whether he was forced to do this because of the pressures engendered by the Egyptian conquest, as Tarn suggests,²¹ or was forced to do so by his maternal uncle, Alexander, satrap of Sardis, as Miss Hanson suggests,²² is unimportant. What really mattered was that Asia Minor was

17. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 39

18. CAH 7, p. 720

19. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 53

20. CAH 7, p. 720

21. Ibid.

22. Hansen, Attalids, p. 34

now held by someone other than the rightful monarch, and Seleucus could not and would not allow matters to remain in such a state.

Therefore, in 240/39, after King Seleucus II had recovered his domains from Ptolemy, he turned to deal with his brother.²³ He successfully invaded Lydia but failed to take Sardis. In the following year he attacked Mithridates of Pontus, an ally of his brother. Faced with this situation, Hierax allied himself with the Gauls of Galatia and came to the defense of Pontus. His Gauls cut Seleucus' force to pieces at Ancyra (236)²⁴ and the king retreated south.²⁵

It was probably at this time that Arsaces II Tiridates, the King of Parthia, heartened by the defeat imposed on the Seleucids by Euergetes not long previously and the civil war now raging, seized Hyrcania (ca. 235 B.C.). Mr. Rawlinson said of Seleucus that

on hearing of the loss of Hyrcania, he proceeded immediately to patch up a peace with his brother . . . against whom at the time he was contending, and having collected a large army, marched . . . East.²⁶

It appears that the price of this peace was the surrender of Asia Minor to Antiochus,²⁷ for nothing more is heard of Seleucus in regard to this area. Now Hierax is found fighting the Attalids

23. CAH 7, p. 720

24. Botsford, Hel. Hist., p. 301

25. CAH 7, p. 720

26. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 54

27. Botsford, Hel. Hist., p. 306

of Pergamum rather than his brother for the hegemony of Asia Minor.

While Seleucus II was carrying on his ill-fated campaign in the east, a campaign which will be dealt with in greater detail in a later chapter, the Attalids of Pergamum were taking advantage of chaotic conditions to establish their own independence. In three battles Attalus defeated Antiochus Hierax and brought under his own sway by 228 B.C. all of Seleucid Asia Minor north of the Taurus.²⁸

Although Antiochus had been forced out of Asia Minor, he was still very much in the picture. Ever scheming and ever ambitious, he made a compact with his aunt, Stratonice, the divorced wife of Demetrius II of Macedon, to overthrow his brother Seleucus II and seize the kingdom. Stratonice raised a rebellion in Antioch while Hierax invaded Mesopotamia. Seleucus II, who had already been defeated by the combined forces of the Parthians and the Bactrians, immediately returned to deal successfully with the revolt. He executed his traitorous aunt, but his brother escaped into Thrace where some wandering Gauls put an end to his colorful but bothersome career.²⁹ Seleucus II was now free to deal with Attalus but died before he could accomplish anything (226 B.C.).³⁰

He was succeeded by his son Alexander who took the

28. CAH 7, p. 721

29. Ibid. p.722

30. Ibid. p.723

throne name of Seleucus III.³¹ The young monarch turned his energies towards the recovery of Seleucid Asia Minor from the Attalids, sending many expeditions between the years 226-223, all of which were unsuccessful.³² Finally, Seleucus himself went north only to find his death at the hands of a Gallic assassin, after a reign of three years.³³ He was succeeded in 223 by his younger brother Antiochus, a youth not yet twenty years old.

31. CAH 7, p. 723

32. Hansen, Attalids, p. 34

33. Ibid.

CHAPTER III

AN OUTLINE OF SELEUCID AFFAIRS 223-211 B.C.

Upon the death of Seleucus III, Achaeus, the late king's cousin and governor of Seleucid Asia Minor, i.e. of the areas recovered in the assaults on the Attalids, became prominent; for he was strong and capable, and it was thought that at this time he would seize the opportunity to make his province and himself independent. But he did not. Instead, he remained loyal to the legitimate line, declaring for Antiochus and punishing those guilty of murdering Seleucus.¹ Achaeus, who had been first invested as governor by Seleucus III, was now invested again as such by Antiochus. Returning to his province he applied himself to the suppression of the ambitious Attalids. The "recently gained empire of Attalus disappeared"² and by 220 Attalus was driven back into the proper limits of Pergamum.³

About the same time that Achaeus was re-invested with the governorship of Asia Minor, Antiochus also delegated the satrapy of Media to Molon and the satrapy of Persia to the latter's brother, Alexander. Within one year both had rebelled against the central government, no doubt encouraged by the example set by Parthia, Bactria, and a number of other provinces.

1. CAH 7, p. 723

2. Hansen, Attalids, p. 34

3. CAH 7, p. 723

In the following spring, that of 221, the royal council heard conflicting advice as to what should be done regarding this eastern uprising. Epigenes, the general who had led the army safely home from Asia Minor after the assassination of Seleucus III, advised that an expedition be sent against the rebels led by the king himself. The king's Prime Minister, however, a Carian named Hermeias, counselled otherwise. He favored the sending eastward of a force commanded by generals and the king's invading that part of Syria held by Egypt. For the time being, at least, the counsel of Hermeias prevailed and a force commanded by Xenon and Theodotus Hermiolus was sent against Molon.⁴ The Prime Minister, according to Polybius, persuaded the king to his plan partially by means of a forged letter,⁵ whose authorship he attributed to Achaeus in which that man was reported to say that

Ptolemy had urged him to assert his right to the government: and promised to supply him with ships and money for all his attempts, if he would only take the crown, and come forward in the sight of all the world as a claimant of the sovereign power;⁶

Antiochus was completely taken in by this forgery and was ready and eager to make a campaign against Ptolemy.

Meanwhile, Molon was planning for the struggle which he

4. Polybius, Histories 5.42

5. In view of Achaeus' later actions, one wonders if the letter was really forged.

6. Polybius, Histories 5.42

knew must come. In his province of Media, he readied himself

partly by holding out to them (i.e. the people in the satrapy) hopes of advantages to be gained and partly by working on the fears of their chief men, by means of forged letters purporting to be from the king and couched in threatening terms.⁷

Also, he had

secured the co-operation of the neighboring satrapies by winning the good will of their leading men with bribes.⁸

Having thus prepared himself, Molon marched against the royal force commanded by Xenon and Theodotus Hermiolus and defeated it, probably in 221 B.C.⁹ He had before the battle been a formidable enemy; for Media was rich in men, grain, and horses. Now, however, because of the defeat of the royal forces he held all Apolloniā¹⁰ and had "a superabundance of supplies".¹¹

Upon hearing of the defeat of his generals, the king decided to go against the rebels himself, but once more

7. Polybius, Histories 5.43

8. Ibid.

9. CAH 7, p. 724

10. Apolloniatis is in fact one of the divisions of Assyria in the geography of the Greeks; but it is impossible to determine its limits. Polybius (v.44) makes Mesopotamia and Apolloniatis the southern boundaries of Media, and Apolloniatis is therefore east of the Tigris. This appears, indeed, from another passage in Polybius (v.51), which also shows that Apollonia was east of the Tigris. . . . There is evidently great confusion in the divisions of Assyria by the Greek geographers. If we place Apolloniatis south of the district of Arbela, and make it extend as far as Bagdad, there may be great error. There seems to be no authority for fixing the site of Apollonia.

Wm. Smith, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography
Vol. 1, p. 161

11. Polybius, Histories 5.43

Hermeias was successful in keeping Antiochus engrossed in a Syrian campaign. Instead, another royal force under the command of the Achaean Xenoetas marched east, also in 221 B.C.¹² This force fared even worse than did the first. At its approach, the forces of Molon fled, leaving behind their camp. The royal forces took the camp, looted it, and fell to drinking. In the night Molon returned. The royal soldiery could not be awakened from their drunken slumber, a great number of them being butchered in their beds. Xeneotas died fighting.¹³ Following his victory over Xeneotas

he took Seleucia and secured Babylonia and Chaldea, though Diogenes of Susiana successfully held Susa against him. He then conquered Parapotamia as far north as Dura Europus on the Euphrates¹⁴

Hearing of this second defeat, Antiochus put aside his plans for a Syrian campaign and determined to take the field against the rebels in person, a course which the old general Epigenes had been suggesting from the first.¹⁵ This time Hermeias was overruled. Antiochus and the royal army marched east to meet Molon.¹⁶ In the ensuing battle the rebel right wing remained faithful but the left deserted to the king. The army was thrown into confusion. Molon realized what the outcome must be and the fate he would suffer, should he be

12. CAH 7, p. 725

13. Polybius, Histories 5.48

14. CAH 7, p. 724

15. Polybius, Histories 5.41/2

16. CAH 7, p. 725

taken alive. Therefore, he and many of his fellow rebels took their own lives. Molon's body was ostentatiously impaled "on the most conspicuous spot in Media."¹⁷

Elated by his relatively easy victory, and having put the government of Media and Persia in order, Antiochus put on a show of force for the surrounding barbarians. He went so far as to cross the Zagros Mountains where the old ruler of the Satrapeii acknowledged Antiochus as his sovereign, a clear extension of the latter's power since the former had long been independent.¹⁸

When Antiochus returned home, late in 220, all was no longer quiet in Asia Minor. Achaeus, the cousin who had helped establish the king firmly on the throne after the assassination of his brother had, early in 220, turned traitor. Thinking that the king might never return from his eastern campaign, he assumed the diadem and planned to lead his forces south to seize Antioch and the crown. Achaeus, however, like Molon before him, underestimated the loyalty which the Seleucid house inspired in the people. Thus, when the troops of Achaeus discovered that they were marching against the king, they rebelled and the traitor was forced into the expedient of attacking some Pisidian tribes.¹⁹ The great booty gained in these campaigns reconciled the soldiery to Achaeus, but the king

17. Polybius, Histories 5.54

18. CAH 7, p. 723

19. Ibid. p. 725

now knew that his cousin was disloyal.

Since the troops of his cousin were loyal even if his cousin was not, and now that Molon and Alexander had been crushed, Antiochus was able to march south to meet Ptolemy in complete safety. Meanwhile, Achaeus was busy conquering parts of Asia Minor hitherto not Seleucid.²⁰ At Raphia, in 217, Antiochus and Ptolemy met in a great battle. The Syrian king was thoroughly defeated, but the victor granted easy terms and peace was made.

Meanwhile in Asia Minor, Achaeus had gotten himself involved in a war on behalf of Byzantium against Rhodes and Bithynia (219).²¹ This war had arisen over Byzantium's levying of taxes on shipping through the Dardanelles in order to raise money for the Gallic tribute.²² While Achaeus was thus engaged, Attalus of Pergamum, the champion of Hellenism in the previous Gallic wars brought over from Europe a new tribe of Gauls, the Aigosages, with whose aid he proceeded to recover from the disasters which Achaeus had inflicted upon him.²³ Attalus and Achaeus battled throughout the years 218 and 217, Achaeus ably holding his own, but in 216 Antiochus, freed from his southern campaign, headed north and reached an agreement with Attalus. In concert they waged war against Achaeus who was soon bottled

20. CAH 7, p. 726

21. Ibid. p. 725

22. Hansen, Attalids, p. 38

23. CAH 7, p. 725

up and besieged in Sardis.²⁴ After Sardis had been under siege for two years (216-14), the city, the garrison, and Achaeus were betrayed to Antiochus. Achaeus was most barbarously executed by his royal cousin²⁵ in 214.²⁶

With Achaeus out of the way, Antiochus could now turn his attention to Armenia, where the local dynasty no longer paid tribute.²⁷ Thus in 212 he marched on the Armenian capitol, Arsamosata (modern Elazig in Turkey).²⁸ The young prince, Xerxes, (probably a son of Arsames, a former ally of Antiochus Hierax) submitted almost immediately.²⁹ Antiochus was magnanimous, exacted for the arrears much less than was owing,³⁰ and betrothed his sister Antiochis to Xerxes. In doing so, Polybius says that he won the affection and support of the surrounding countryside.³¹

And now, in 213, after being on the throne for ten years, all was quiet in the western part of his empire. The rebellions of Alexander and Molon had been crushed, the revolt of the king's cousin, Achaeus, had been put down and Armenia was once again paying tribute. Therefore, Antiochus could now turn to the Far East where he would win the title of "the Great".

24. Hansen, Attalids, p. 44

25. Polybius, Histories 7.22

26. OCD, Achaeus

27. CAH 8, p. 140

28. Latitude and longitude taken from the Atlas of Ancient and Classical Geography by Rhys. They were then plotted on a National Geographic Society map.

29. CAH 8, p. 140

30. Polybius, Histories 7.25

31. Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGN - PART I

Antiochus had many good reasons for marching east and these will be discussed in a later chapter, but the immediate casus belli was quite probably the seizure of Media by Artabanus of Parthia¹ in 211 B.C.,² while the Syrian kingdom was yet relatively disorganized following the struggle with Achaeus in Asia Minor. The Parthian took advantage of this instability "to advance into Media, and to add to his domains the entire tract between Hyrcania and the Zagros Mountains."³ It is entirely possible, but not unanimously agreed upon by scholars, that Artabanus took Ecbatana and thus threatened the Mesopotamian lands. Upon hearing of this seizure, "Antiochus levied a vast army" and marched east⁴ in the winter of 211/10.⁵

Parthia and Bactria were not the only provinces to break away from the Greek empire of the Seleucids, nor were they the first.

1. Rawlinson, SGM 3, p. 30

2. Rawlinson puts the seizure of Media by Artabanus at 214 B.C. while Antiochus was involved in Asia Minor with Achaeus, however, this is impossible since Artabanus did not succeed to the Parthian throne until 211. (HCD, Achaeus, p. 133 and other references). The 214 date could however, be postulated if evidence could be found which established Tiridates as the king who seized Media rather than Artabanus.

3. Rawlinson, SGM 3, p. 31

4. Ibid.

5. CAH 8, p. 140

Even during the time of Alexander's great conquests, a Persian satrap, Atropatenes, succeeded in converting his satrapy of Upper Media - thenceforward called Media Atropatene -- into an independent sovereignty.⁶

Early in the reign of Antiochus I, Persia seems to have become independent, though for but a short time only.⁷ It would seem that the disintegration of the empire began after the death of Seleucus I and never ceased "until the last days of the dynasty."⁸ Between the death of that monarch in 280 and the successful revolt of Parthia and Bactria, ca. 256-248, Cappadocia established itself as an independent state under Ariarthus, the founder of the Cappadocian dynasty. Also the once Persian provinces of Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Pontus had revolted; and so there were, aside from the major kingdoms of Alexander's successors, several kingdoms which had their origins in successful revolts.⁹

With these successful uprisings as examples, the satrapies of Bactria and Parthia revolted. The consensus of opinion is that Bactria was the first to rebel in 256 B.C., and that Parthia followed some six years later in 250; however, Frye states that:

Indications in classical sources would lead us to diametrically opposite conclusions: that the Bactrians revolted before the Parthians, or just the reverse.¹⁰

The origins and course of the Parthian revolt are

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- 6. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 45
 - 7. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 429
 - 8. Ibid.
 - 9. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 45
 - 10. Frye, Heritage, p. 169

obscure, and matters on which scholars do not unanimously agree. Rostovtzeff says that sometime around 250 B.C., Parthia revolted under the leadership of her satrap Andragoras. Then, an invading nomadic Iranian tribe, the Parni, under its king Arsaces, conquered Andragoras and seized Parthia.¹¹ Rawlinson has set forth three theories taken from ancient authors concerning the Parthian rebellion. The first account is that Arsaces was a Bactrian who fled following the revolt of Diodotus to Parthia "where he induced the natives to revolt and accept him for their monarch."¹² Strabo is the original source for this theory.¹³ The second account is that Arsaces and Tiridates were insulted by an official. Taking five men into their confidence, they slew the offending official and then "induced their nation to revolt from the Macedonians and set up a government of their own, . . ."¹⁴ Rawlinson took this account from the Fragments of Arrian.¹⁵ The third account also originates with Strabo and he states that Arsaces was a Scythian who

with some of the Daae (I mean the Aparnians, as they were called, nomads who lived along the Ochus), invaded Parthia and conquered it.¹⁶

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- 11. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 430
 - 12. Rawlinson, SGM 3, p. 25
 - 13. Strabo, Geography 11.9.3
 - 14. Rawlinson, SGM 3, p. 25
 - 15. Arrian, Fragments 1
 - 16. Strabo, Geography 11.9.2

But Strabo goes on to say:

They say that the Aparnian Daae were immigrants from the Daae above Lake Maeotis, who are called the Xandii or Parii. But the view is not altogether accepted that the Daae are a part of the Scythians who live about Maeotis.¹⁷

Thus, it is not certain when the revolt occurred, nor the circumstances surrounding the uprising. Not even the racial identity of the Parthians is really known. All that one can say is that Parthia did revolt, under a leader named Arsaces, probably about 250 B.C. Strabo relates:

Now at the outset Arsaces was weak, being continually at war with those who had been deprived by him of their territory, both he himself and his successors, . . .¹⁸

Those disputing the Parthian monarch's authority were probably Greeks living in the province "who may have been tolerably numerous and whose strength would lie in the towns."¹⁹

Arsaces was not destined to rule long, for he died two years after his successful revolution, perhaps in battle "according to some later authors of small account."²⁰ He left his fledgling kingdom to his brother Tiridates in a "somewhat weak and unsettled condition".²¹ Though weak and chaotic, Parthia had two points working in her favor. The first was that Antiochus II, the Seleucid king who was ruling at the time of the revolt was an incompetent; the second was that when Tiridates was taking over the reins of kingship,

17. Strabo, Geography . 11.9.3

18. Ibid. 11.9.2

19. Rawlinson, SGM 3, p. 25

20. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 50 ref. to Justin xli.5

21. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 51

Antiochus II Theos died, and the Laodicean War broke out.²²

The successful campaign of young Ptolemy III Euergetes into the eastern Seleucid domains gave the Syrian king Seleucus II no time to make a campaign against a rebellious province.²³

Seleucus II could not deal with the upstart Parthians while he was engaged with the Egyptian, and after peace was made with Ptolemy, civil war broke out between the king and his brother Antiochus Hierax.²⁴ Thus the Parthians had some fifteen years to organize and establish themselves. Not until after Arsaces II Tiridates had seized Hyrcania (ca. 235 B.C.) did the Parthians have to face a royal army. Then when Seleucus heard of Hyrcania's loss, he made peace with his brother, and having collected a large force, marched east.²⁵

The king did not proceed immediately against Arsaces II but instead entered into negotiations with the Bactrian monarch Diodotus and made an alliance with him against the Parthian. Tiridates did not await the arrival of the allied force, but "withdrew into the country of the Apasiacae."²⁶ These Apasiacae were a Scythian people. He was not forced to remain in exile a long time, however; for upon hearing of the death of Diodotus ca. 234,²⁷ he was successful in winning the new king Diodotus II over to his side. Together they met and defeated Seleucus II ca. 234/33. Since he

22. 246 B.C., CAH 7, p. 717

23. vide p. 6

24. vide p. 8

25. Ibid.

26. Strabo, Geography 11.8.8

27. vide Chronological Table A

was later fully occupied at home with Stratonice, Hierax and Attalus for the few years remaining until his death in 226 B.C., the king never came east again.²⁸

Tiridates spent his remaining years profitably; and when he died in 211 he left a powerful and united kingdom to his son Arsaces III Artabanus.²⁹ Meanwhile, Seleucus II had died. He was succeeded by his son Alexander who ruled as Seleucus III for but three years and was then assassinated (223 B.C.). He was succeeded by his younger brother Antiochus III. Twelve years later, in 211, Artabanus succeeded to the Parthian throne and immediately declared war on Antiochus by seizing Media. Antiochus then began his "anabasis".

28. vide p. 9

29. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 51

CHAPTER V

THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGN - PART II

In the winter of 211/10 Antiochus sailed down the Euphrates presumably from Antioch and was, late in 210, in Media preparing for his great venture. To finance this campaign, it is recorded that the king sacked the great temple of Anaitis at Ecbatana obtaining some four thousand talents.¹

Next year, (209) having taken the precaution of proclaiming his eldest son, Antiochus, a boy of eleven, joint king, he left Ecbatana with a powerful army²

Justin numbers this army at one hundred thousand foot and twenty thousand horse³ a figure which is far too high considering the fact that Antiochus put but sixty-eight thousand in the line at Raphia and seventy-two thousand at Magnesia.⁴ It would seem likely that the expeditionary force numbered no more than forty to fifty thousand, if one considers the logistical problems involved.

Like Alexander before him, Antiochus followed the great road which led to Hecatompylos through the Caspian Gates. The Parthian king, Artabanus, had expected Antiochus to come as far as Media but he had not expected that the king would attempt to cross the adjoining desert into Parthia.⁵ When, however, he perceived that Antiochus meant to do just

1. CAH 8, p. 140

2. Ibid.

3. CAH 8, p. 140 Ref. to Justin xli.5.7

4. Cary, *His. of the Gr. World*, p. 231

5. Polybius, *Histories* x.28

that, "he endeavored to choke up and spoil the wells."⁶
 But the king learned of Artabanus' plan and sent one
 thousand horse forward under Nicomedes for the purpose of
 forestalling the Parthian. The cavalry found that Arsaces III
 had retired with his main force, but they did come across
 some enemy horse engaged in choking up the wells. These they
 attacked and drove off. Having secured his water supply, the
 king crossed the desert without further hindrance and still
 following the route of Alexander, he came into Parthia where
 he took the capital, Hecatompylos (? 209) without a battle.⁷

After Arsaces had failed in his attempt to choke
 up the wells, he retreated into Hyrcania, not even attempting
 to defend his capital.⁸ Antiochus, having rested his army
 here at Hecatompylos continued his pursuit of the Parthian
 monarch. This meant he had to cross the Elburz Mountains.

Arriving at the foot of this range, he learned from
 the natives that

the country he had to cross until he reached the ridges
 of Mount Labus, was exceedingly rough and difficult,
 and that large numbers of barbarians were stationed at
 the narrowest points.⁹

These barbarians were the Tapurians and presumably they were

6. Polybius, Histories x.28

7. Ibid.

From the Caspian Gates to Hecatompylos is 1260 stades.

- Strabo, Geography 11.9.1

8. Polybius, Histories x.29

9. Ibid.

allied with Arsaces.¹⁰

As the Seleucid force advanced, it found the ground much rougher and the passes far narrower than had been expected. The army had to ascend about three hundred stades and a great deal of the pass was

the bed of a winter torrent of great depth, into which numerous rocks and trees had been hurled by natural causes from the overhanging precipices, . . . to say nothing of the obstacles which the barbarians had helped to construct expressly to impede them.¹¹

The defenders had chopped down many trees and had piled up mounds of rock and had also invested all the high points along the gully "which were at once convenient for attack and capable of covering themselves."¹² Thus situated the Tapurians would have been able to withstand the king indefinitely, but for one error. They did not perceive, that although the phalanx and baggage had no other alternative but to take the aforementioned route along the river bed, there was nothing to prevent the light-armed from scaling the gully walls and those mountains flanking the enemy positions. Once the light-armed forces were above the enemy's strongpoints, the affray took on an entirely different aspect. Being in a higher position

10. CAH 8, p. 141

Concerning these barbarians, Strabo writes

It is a custom of the Tapuri to dress in black and wear their hair long, and for the women to dress in white and wear their hair short.

- Strabo, Geography : 11.11.8

11. Polybius, Histories x.30

12. Ibid.

the light-armed troops pelted the defending barbarians with a barrage of rocks and missiles and thus they forced them to retire. With the enemy having been dislodged and the light-armed above assuring safety, the 'pioneers' could now come forward and clear the way up the gully. Meanwhile, the light-armed: slingers, archers, and javelin men advanced in skirmishing order along the high ground, reforming every now and again to take an enemy strongpoint. The enemy then withdrew to the summit of Mount Labus and there awaited the king with their entire force.¹³ Therefore, thanks to his light-armed troops, Antiochus reached the summit without loss on the eighth day. Here at the summit of the pass the barbarians offered battle. Once again, the light-armed won the day, for although the barbarians fought well against the phalanx, they panicked and fled upon perceiving that a number of light-armed troops were in their rear. Thus the king came safely into Hyrcania, probably late in the summer of 209.¹⁴

Descending into the Hyrcanian plain, the army came to Tambrax, a large unwallled town containing a royal palace, and here they encamped. Most of the natives of Tambrax had previously fled to the nearby walled town of Sirynx, considered the capital of Hyrcania.¹⁵

13. Polybius, Histories x.30

14. Ibid. x.31

15. Strabo considers the capital as being Tape, some 1400 stades from the Caspian Gates.

- Strabo, Geography 11.7.2

Sirynx was an extremely well-defended town having

three trenches thirty cubits broad and fifteen deep; with a double vallum on the edge of each, and behind these there was a strong wall . . . (however) owing to the number employed and the activity of the king, it was not long before the trenches were choked up and the walls undermined and fell.¹⁶

The inhabitants felt that all was lost; and so, when they had killed all the Greeks in the town and had stripped everything of value, they attempted to flee. Unfortunately for them, however, Antiochus learned of their plans and sent a body of mercenaries after them. At the approach of this force, those fleeing dropped their booty and ran back to the town only to be met by a force of peltasts pouring into the town through a breach in the walls. Thus dismayed, the defenders surrendered. Artabanus, however, had escaped.¹⁷

Now we lose all sight of Antiochus, but it would appear that the king spent considerable time, probably the rest of 209, besieging towns in Hyrcania in a vain attempt to capture the Parthian monarch. Arsaces III, however, carried on continuous guerilla warfare.¹⁸ Sometime during the winter of 209/08 the warring monarchs came to terms.¹⁹ Antiochus must have recognized the independence of Parthia and the royal title of Arsaces III Artabanus, at least as a client king. According to Rawlinson, Antiochus allowed Artabanus to retain Hyrcania.²⁰

16. Polybius, Histories x.31

17. Ibid.

18. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 60

19. CAH 8, p. 141

20. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 61

However, on this point Holleaux disagrees, stating that the Parthians withdrew "apparently from Comesine and Hyrcania as well as Choarene . . ." ²¹ This point is really of small importance. What is of greater importance is that Antiochus allowed the Parthian king to keep anything at all. It might be argued that the Syrian allowed Arsaces III to keep his crown because he felt that continuing the guerilla warfare in the Hyrcanian Mountains was not worth the effort. A much more attractive reason, however, for allowing the Parthians to remain independent presents itself upon reading The Geography of Strabo. He says,

On the left and opposite these peoples (i.e. the Parthians, Bactrians, Arians etc.) are situated the Scythian or nomadic tribes, which cover the whole of the northern side. ²²

Leaving Parthia autonomous would create a buffer state between these nomadic Scyths and the Seleucid domains at no cost to the Seleucids.

Arsaces III, for his part, became an ally of Antiochus, nominally at least ²³ and remained at peace for the remainder of his reign. That the struggle with Antiochus greatly taxed the Parthians is shown by the fact that the son and successor of Artabanus, Priapatius, also remained at peace. It is not until

21. CAH 8, p. 141

22. Strabo, Geography 11.7.2

23. He may have also promised to aid Antiochus in the coming Bactrian campaign, but of this, there is no proof.

- Rawlinson, SGM 3, p. 31

181 B.C., nearly thirty years later, under Arsaces V Phraates I, that Parthia resumes the aggressive policies of Arsaces II Tiridates.²⁴ Having thus made a settlement in Parthia, Antiochus turned east to deal with the rebellious province of Bactria-Sogdiana.

24. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 60

CHAPTER VI

THE BACTRIAN CAMPAIGN - PART I

Approximately the same time as, or perhaps somewhat earlier than the Parthian revolt, the Bactrians proclaimed their independence. The Bactrian revolt differs from that of Arsaces, however, in that the Parthian rebellion was more "a national uprising . . ."¹ whereas the Bactrian was of the ordinary Oriental type.² The Greek satrap, Diodotus, perceived the opportunity to revolt and took it.

Ambition apart, Diodotus believed that resistance to the perpetual incursions of nomads could be better organized from Bactra than from Antioch.³

. . . or even from Babylonia, and that the man on the spot must have the authority and power of decision which could belong only to a monarch.⁴

Also, because of these constant nomadic incursions, the Greeks in Bactria tended to be concerned primarily with their own defense and to be indifferent to the affairs of the rest of the empire. Being so far from the center of realm and receiving so little aid from the Syrian monarch, they did not have the same loyalty for the Seleucid House which the troops of Acheaus and Molon possessed.

The Bactrians themselves must be taken into account as well. Rawlinson writes:

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1. Smith, H. of I. p. 197
 2. Ibid. p. 196
 3. CAH 7, p. 718
 4. Tarn, JHS 1x (1940), p. 94

the people were hardy and valiant; they were generally treated with exceptional favor by the Persian monarchs⁵ and they seem to have had traditions which assigned them a pre-eminence among the Arian tribes at some indefinitely distant period. We may presume that they would gladly support the bold enterprise of their new monarch, they would feel their vanity flattered by the establishment of an independent Bactria, even though it were under Greek kings:⁶

As was the case with the Parthian revolt, that of the Bactrians was aided by the war of succession (i.e. the Laodicean War 246-241) which followed upon the death of Antiochus II Theos.⁷ This conflict gave Diodotus a chance to consolidate his position. When the succession issue had been finally settled, and Seleucus II had made peace with his brother Hierax, he turned to the rebellious provinces, ca.235,

As was mentioned earlier, Seleucus did not march immediately against Parthia, but rather he made common cause with Diodotus against Tiridates. Tiridates then fled north but upon hearing of the death of the Bactrian king,⁸ he opened negotiations with the new king, Diodotus II and was successful in winning Bactria over to the Parthian side. Together they soundly defeated Seleucus. After this defeat, the Seleucids did not venture east again for over twenty years.

Although the Syrian monarchs left Bactria at peace for the following two decades, all did not remain quiet in

5. Bactria was regarded by the Achaemenids as the "premier province" and was always reserved for a prince of the blood.

- Smith, H. of I. p. 195

6. Rawlinson, SGM 3, pp. 23, 24

7. Smith, H. of I., p. 197

8. For the death of Diodotus I see Chronological Table A

Bactria. Around 230 B.C.⁹, Euthydemus, the son-in-law of Diodotus, rebelled and took the reins of power into his own hands.

Euthydemus was a Greek from one of the Magnesias; it has been thought that Magnesia-under-Sipylos is the more likely because one of his coin types resembles the type of certain cities in the neighborhood of this Magnesia (not, be it noted, of Magnesia itself); but it is hard to believe that Polybius would call a man from the less important of the two cities a 'Magnesian' without any qualification¹⁰ and it is probable that Euthydemus came from the great city on the Maeander which had already sent so many of her sons to the east.¹¹

Against this monarch Antiochus marched, probably in the spring of 208¹²

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9. Smith, H. of I., p. 196
10. Tarn, Gks. in B. and I., p. 74 ref. to Polybius, Histories xl. 31.1
11. Ibid.
12. CAH 8, p. 141

CHAPTER VII

THE BACTRIAN CAMPAIGN - PART II

The coming of Antiochus was known to Euthydemus and that monarch awaited the arrival of the Syrian king at a fortress called Gouriana.¹

The Bactrian king had with him some ten thousand horse at the Lower Arius with which to contest the crossing of Antiochus.

Meanwhile, Antiochus, but three days away, heard of this and planned to attack this guard force.² For two days, Antiochus and the army marched towards the river at a moderate pace,

but on the third, after dinner, he gave orders for the rest of the army to start next day at daybreak; while he himself, with his cavalry and light-armed troops and ten thousand peltasts, started in the night and pushed off at a great rate.³

Antiochus had learned that although the enemy had a force of ten thousand awaiting him at the river, this force retired to a town some twenty stades distant at night.

1. Kiessling writing in Pauly-Wissowa (s.v. "Guriane" 14, 1945) identifies Gouriana with Ghurian on the Here Rud, west of Herat, however, it is most unlikely that Antiochus coming from Parthia and about to invade Bactria, should go so far south. It is much more probable that the king was following the usual route to Bactria which crosses the Lower Arius and that Euthydemus, covering his capital should await him here. Ptolemy (vi. 10.4) gives a Gouriana in Margiana which would appear to be the Gouriana to which Polybius is referring.

- CAH 8, p. 141

2. Polybius, Histories x.49

3. Ibid.

Because of this he was able to convey the greater part of his army across the river before the Bactrians returned at dawn. The Bactrians immediately charged. The king, having summoned his two thousand guardsmen, and having ordered the others "to form their companies and squadrons, and take up their order . . ."⁴ advanced with his two thousand against the Bactrian vanguard. "In this engagement Antiochus is reputed to have shown the greatest gallantry of any of his men."⁵ Both sides suffered heavy losses, and although the king's men repelled the first enemy attack, the second and third onslaughts pressed them sorely. This hard struggle was decided when a certain Panaetolus relieved the king's force with the remainder of the cavalry. The Bactrians fled in confusion and

they never drew rein before the charge of Panaetolus, until they rejoined Euthydemus (presumably at Gouriana) with a loss of more than half their number.⁶

In this encounter Antiochus lost a horse from under him and several teeth.⁷

Being worsted at the river crossing, Euthydemus and his force retired to the capital, Zariaspa Bactra. As in Parthia, here also in Bactria, Antiochus disappears completely from view, and all that remains is the knowledge of a stubborn two-year war, "a vague memory of the siege of Bactra, which

4. Polybius, Histories x.49

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

remained famous among the Greeks."⁸

After two years of deadlock, presumably 208-206, both sides entered into negotiations. Euthydemus assured Telias, the envoy of Antiochus, that he himself was not a rebel, but rather he had "destroyed the descendant of some who had been such, and so had obtained the kingdom of Bactria."⁹ Along with other arguments of the same line, he urged Telias to beg of Antiochus that he

not grudge him the royal title and dignity for if he did not yield to this demand, neither of them would be safe, seeing that great hordes of nomads were close at hand who were a danger to both; and if they admitted them into the country, it would certainly be utterly barbarized.¹⁰

And Bactria was, after all, the furthest eastern outpost of Hellenism. Since Antiochus had long been searching for some way to end hostilities¹¹ and since he was doubtless astute enough to grasp the wisdom of this line of reasoning, he readily listened. Nilikanta Sastri writes,

the existence of a strong and independent Bactria as a buffer state between Syria and the lands inhabited by the barbarians was far more advantageous to Antiochus's real interests than that of a weak vassal Syrian province.¹²

Euthydemus sent his son Demetrius "to confirm the terms of the treaty."¹³ The young Demetrius made such a good impression on the

8. CAH 8, p. 141

9. Polybius, Histories xi.3⁴

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Nilikanta Sastri, Comp. His. of India, p. 148

13. Polybius, Histories, xi.3⁴

king that Antiochus promised him one of his daughters,¹⁴
 and to Euthydemus he "conceded the royal title."¹⁵ And, as
 well, Antiochus

having on other points caused a written treaty to be
 drawn up and the terms of the treaty to be confirmed on
 oath, he marched away; after liberally provisioning the
 troops, and accepting the elephants belonging to
 Euthydemus.¹⁶

The fragments of Polybius make no mention as to whether or
 not Euthydemus accepted Seleucid overlordship

but as the first overtures towards peace came from
 him, and he surrendered his elephants, probably he
 did, although it soon became a dead letter.¹⁷

When Antiochus departed in 206¹⁸ Euthydemus began to expand
 in those directions which would not antagonize the Seleucid
 monarch, and did not begin to incorporate Seleucid domains
 until the Romans broke the power of Antiochus at Magnesia.¹⁹

14. Nilikanta Sastri, Comp. His. of India, p. 148

15. Polybius, Histories xi.34

16. Ibid.

17. Tarn, Gks. in B. and I., p. 82

18. CAH 8, p. 142

19. Tarn, Gks. in B. and I., p. 82

CHAPTER VIII

THE INDIAN CAMPAIGN - PART I

The Indians had doubtless made previous contact with individual Greeks since "Ionian Greeks may have been exiled to Bactria by the Achaemenid kings; . . ." ¹ but the first Graeco-Indian contact on a large scale did not take place until Alexander had conquered some of the lands held by Indian rulers in the northwest. And since, however, he remained but nineteen months

it is manifestly impossible that during those few months of incessant conflict he should have founded Hellenic institutions on a permanent basis, or materially affected the structure of Hindu policy and society. As a matter of fact, he did nothing of the sort, and within two years of his death, with the exception of some small garrisons under Eudamos in the Indus Valley, the whole apparatus of Macedonian rule had been swept away. After the year 316 B.C. not a trace of it remained. ²

The only vestige of Alexander's presence in India was a coin type modelled on the Greek which was struck by a local chieftain. ³

Some twenty years after the death of Alexander (ca. 300 B.C.) Seleucus Nicator attempted to recover the Indian provinces but failed. Strabo makes mention of the peace treaty which Seleucus made with the Indian monarch, Chandragupta Maurya, "in which Seleucus ceded certain provinces and gave the Indian a daughter or a niece, receiving in return five hundred elephants." ⁴ Smith writes that the land ceded was "a large

1. Frye, Heritage, p. 167

2. Smith, H. of I., p. 210

3. Ibid.

4. Tarn, JHS 1x(1940), p. 86 ref. to Strabo, Geography xv.724

part of Ariana, west of the Indus, . . ."5 The peace itself Rostovtzeff regards as having been made primarily to keep open the trade routes to the east. He says:

It was probably to secure the safety of these routes that Seleucus gave up his claims to part of India and preferred peaceful traffic with Chandragupta and his empire of Magadha to continuous and ruinous war. Through cordial relations and repeated embassies . . . the Seleucids insured a steady supply of war elephants and of Indian wares.⁶

The Syrian king would be especially desirous of securing a steady supply of elephants for they were an important part of his army and the army was a Hellenistic monarch's most important possession. After this treaty was made, a century passed before Greek arms were once again carried into Indian territory.

5. Smith, H. of I., p. 210

6. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 459

CHAPTER IX

THE INDIAN CAMPAIGN - PART II

Having come to terms with Euthydemus in Bactria in 206,¹ Antiochus "retired over the Hindu Kush Mountains where he met an Indian king, Sophagesenus, in the Kabul valley . . ."² Here he renewed "the old alliance of the Seleucidae with the Maurya princes . . ."³ and obtained a "number of elephants . . ."⁴ from that king raising the total number of elephants in the Seleucid force to one hundred and fifty. Since he had already received an unspecified number from Euthydemus it is impossible to know how many Sophagesenus gave over. Then, Antiochus "having once more provisioned his troops, set out again personally with his army."⁵ Antiochus apparently considered this "old alliance" as one between master and vassal since he took not only elephants and supplies, but left behind in India a certain Androstenes of Cyzicus who would take back to Syria the treasure which Sophagesenus had agreed to give him.

The best summation of the Indian campaign is that given by K. A. Nilikanta Sastri who writes:

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1. CAH 8, p. 141
 2. Frye, Heritage, p. 169
 3. Rawlinson, SGM 3, p. 35
 4. Ibid.
 5. Polybius, Histories xi.34

his expedition to India sometime about 206 B.C. was of no great importance, Polybius informs us that, crossing the Hindukush, Antiochus marched down the Kabul valley and encountered one "Sophagesenus, king of the Indians". Who this Sophagesenus was, is not known from Indian sources, but if we accept the authority of Tarant, a Medieval Tibetan historian of Buddhism, he may have been connected with Verasina, the king of Gandhara, who was the great-grandson of Asoka He accepted the token submission of the Indian king who gave him ample supplies for his forces, made over to him a number of war elephants and promised him a large amount of money⁶

Smith considers the extortion of elephants and treasure as a "war indemnity" and Sophagesenus as a "local chief" and goes on to conclude;

This brief campaign can have no appreciable effect on the institutions of India and its occurrence was probably unknown to many courts east of the Indus.⁷

Leaving India, Antiochus crossed Arachosia and the river Enymanthus, went through Drangiana and into Carmania where he spent the winter of 206/05.⁸ "This was the extreme limit of the march of Antiochus into the interior"⁹

In the following spring, that of 205, we find the king in Arabia dealing with the Gerrhaeans. These merchant folk probably inhabited that region now known as Qatar and the Trucial Coast; for Antiochus saw Bahrein¹⁰ and he would see this island only if the Gerrhaeans lived south of it.

6. Nilikanta Sastri, Comp. His. of Ind., p. 148

7. Smith, H. of I., p. 211

8. CAH 8, p. 142

- These provinces lie 30-35N, 55-70E

9. Polybius, Histories xi.3⁴

10. CAH 8, p. 142

To arrive at Gerrha, one might suggest that the king crossed from Asia to Arabia at the narrowest part of the Gulf, from that part of Iran which the ancients called Carmania (modern Kerman) to Oman, having commandeered some of the Seleucid ships which patrolled the Gulf.¹¹

When the king had arrived, the Gerrhaeans demanded of Antiochus that he not destroy "what the gods had given them - perpetual peace and freedom . . ."¹² The king granted this request and in return, says Polybius, a great treasure consisting of five hundred talents of silver, one thousand of frankincense, and two hundred of oil of cinnamon was given him by the Gerrhaeans.¹³ It might be suggested that the treasure was given first and then the request was granted.

To keep an eye on these Gerrhaeans, lest they plunder Seleucid shipping between India and Babylon, the Seleucids maintained a fleet on the Persian Gulf.

At the same time they endeavored, by diplomatic action and military intervention, to keep the Gerrhaeans more or less under control and to obtain from them a large proportion of the Arabian and Indian goods held by their merchants.¹⁵

Thus the incident

11. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 458

12. Polybius, Histories xiii.9

13. Ibid.

14. Holleaux shares this opinion. (CAH 8, p. 142)

15. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 458

was a military expedition on a large scale, which did not and could not lead to the conquest of Gerrha, but was imposing enough to frighten the Gerrhaeans and make them increase the quantity of merchandise that they sent to Seleucia, at the expense probably of the Nabataeans and Ptolemies.¹⁶

Although the evidence is scanty, it would seem that it was "through the Gerrhaeans that the Seleucids received their chief supply of Arabian merchandise and at least a fair amount of Indian goods."¹⁷

The return home from Arabia was uneventful.

It was probably in Seleucia, which he entered in triumph (205/04) after six years bringing one hundred elephants and fabulous booty, that he assumed the Achaemenid title of 'Great King' which the Greeks turned into 'Antiochus the Great'¹⁸

16. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 458

17. Ibid.

18. CAH 8, p. 142

CHAPTER X

THE MOTIVES BEHIND THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN

There were several reasons for undertaking this eastern campaign but the most obvious one is that of reconquest. Antiochus did not intend to rule over a kingdom reduced and weakened by the secession of several provinces. Bactria and Parthia had successfully rebelled, and now the movement was spreading into other parts of the empire. Already Antiochus had been forced to deal with uprisings in Media and Asia Minor, and now as Holleaux says:

It was his high purpose to reconstitute, to the limit of what was practicable, the Seleucid Empire and to reassert his authority over all the countries, which, though rightful dependencies of his house, had broken away from their allegiance.¹

This is one point of view and one that seems to be valid. There is, however, another school of thought in this matter.

Rostovtzeff writes:

Antiochus did not reconquer Parthia and Bactria and did not aim at doing so. By his military operations he demonstrated the strength of Syria and re-established on a firm basis the authority of Seleucid rule among the Asiatic satraps.²

With this evaluation of Antiochus' expedition, I must disagree. If Antiochus did not aim at reconquest but instead wished only to demonstrate Syrian might to the rebellious provinces, he would have made a show of force and returned home. He would not have chased the Parthian king about the Hyrcanian

1. CAH 8, p. 139

2. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 50

hills for over a year, nor would he have spent another two years besieging Zariaspa Bactra. I would suggest that the king set out with every intention of reconquering the secessionist provinces, but when it became apparent that victory, while attainable, would be Pyrrhic, he made the best of the existing situation and came to terms with the rebel monarchs.³

That all these provinces had rebelled from Seleucid overlordship raises a pertinent question: why?

In dealing with their Iranian subjects, the Seleucids made some bad, even fatal mistakes. One of the worst was making Antioch-on-the-Orontes the capital of the empire. The capital was first located at Babylon, but Seleucus I soon moved to Seleucia-on-the-Tigris which was but forty miles from Babylon.⁴ Then Seleucus relocated his capital for a second time, this time at Antioch. Either of these first two cities would have proved a better capital than this most attractive city on the Orontes because of its great distance from the eastern satrapies.⁵

Rawlinson writes in Seven Great Monarchies:

Among the causes which led to the disintegration of the Seleucid kingdom, there is none that deserves so to be considered the main cause as this.⁶

3. For peace terms with Parthia see page 28

For peace terms with Bactria see page 36

4. Rawlinson, SGM 3, p. 20

5. It was calculated at once to produce the desire to revolt, and to render the reduction of the revolted provinces difficult, if not impossible.

- Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 40

6. Rawlinson, SGM 3, p. 21

Because of this lack of interest in the east which Seleucus showed by moving west, the Iranian-speaking satraps were never very loyal to Seleucus and his successors. The Greek settlements in the richer of these satrapies always tended to be separatist in order to better protect themselves against the Iranian tide. Thus insubordination of satraps and secession of some parts of the kingdom under Iranian rulers were the order of the day.⁷

Although shifting the capital from Seleucia-Babylon to Antioch was to prove disastrous, Seleucus had several good reasons for making the move. In the first place, the power of Seleucus, like that of any other Hellenistic prince, was ultimately dependent upon his army and the strength of the army depended upon a core of Greeks and Macedonians. It was necessary, therefore, that he have a center from which he could easily recruit soldiers and mercenaries from the Greeks of both Asia Minor and the Hellenic mainland. This he could not do from Seleucia-on-the-Tigris since that city was too far from the source. Secondly, the Seleucids considered their main interests to be in the west rather than in the east for, as was previously mentioned, the Syrian kings were waging a more or less continuous series of wars with the Ptolemies, wars that they considered to be of paramount importance. Furthermore, the making of Antioch the capital meant that the Seleucid administration remained on the Mediterranean and in the Greek

7. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 429

world. Remaining on the Tigris would have exiled the government from the Hellenic world, for communications were generally neither fast nor overly efficient. Had the administration remained at Seleucia, the empire would have lost its Hellenic character and become another oriental monarchy. Since the capital remained within the Greek-speaking community, the government, therefore, remained Greek. This in turn means that although the administration had its difficulties in governing the eastern satrapies the interior of the Seleucid kingdom was always open to a limited amount of Hellenic influence.

This change of capital, however advantageous it may have seemed to Seleucus at the time, proved to be a fatal error but it need not have been so. First the Seleucids could have hung on if they had concerned themselves with the affairs of their eastern domains, and if they had provided their eastern subjects with an enlightened administration which was both vigorous and efficient. But they did not. Instead, they frittered away their time, their energy, and their resources with their never-ending Syrian wars.⁸

Second, they erred in that they did not follow up Alexander's concept of making Greek and Asian one people with one culture. Instead, they returned to a simpler system, "that of governing a nation of slaves by means of a victorious clique of aliens."⁹ Thus, when the Macedonians replaced the

8. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 40

9. Ibid. p. 41

Achaemenids, "the Iranians lost the reality as well as the symbols, traditions and organization of their central authority."¹⁰ and so they "turned to the local authorities for guidance and gave their allegiance to them"¹¹ In the army many Asiatics served,¹² but all the officers were of Greek or Macedonian parentage. There was no attempt whatsoever to "keep up the self-respect of the Asiatic."¹³ no attempt to alleviate the unpleasantness which conquest and alien rule caused them.

To the dislike which the Iranian already felt for the conquering Greek, the actions of Antiochus II added contempt and disgust. Despised by the Asiatics because of his vice and indolence, he permitted his wives and male favorites to rule as they pleased.¹⁴ This, added to the fact that he contested neither the Parthian nor the Bactrian rebellions, aided greatly in the disintegration of the empire.

Also Tarn writes that it has been suggested that "the Seleucids favored Babylonian religion as a bulwark against Zoroastrianism, the creed of Persian nationalism"¹⁵ In following such a policy, the Seleucids were doing their own cause no good, for as Tarn concludes:

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- 10. Frye, Heritage, p. 35
 - 11. Ibid.
 - 12. vide infra p. 50
 - 13. Rawlinson, Parthia, p. 41
 - 14. Ibid., p. 44
 - 15. Tarn, Hel. Civ., p. 119

indeed the principal weakness which broke up the empire was its failure to secure the cooperation of the Iranian element, which Alexander recognized as vital. The Oriental reaction, when it came, was partly a revolt of the countryside and its creed against the Greek and Babylonian townsman.¹⁶

That the Seleucids never won the confidence of the Iranian is shown by

the very small amount of Iranian cavalry in the Seleucid armies. That cavalry was the best in Asia; and if the Seleucids did not use more of it, it can only have been that they dared not.¹⁷

This is illustrated by the fact that Antiochus had but one thousand Median horse at Magnesia.¹⁸ The Iranians' lack of confidence in the Seleucids is further shown by the fact that they all fell away as soon as the Parthians made it possible.

The rebellion of the provinces was in itself bad enough, but far worse was the loss in money, men and animals. This loss would cause the king far more suffering than would any affront to his pride, and it would be viewed with far more alarm. Many of these revolted lands were exceptionally rich and fertile. As well, Media furnished horses and Bactria, "the ornament of Ariana as a whole"¹⁹ furnished camels to the army. Elephants could easily be obtained from India. The revolt of Bactria and Parthia meant that the supply of camels would cease and that elephants would no longer be readily

16. Tarn, Hel. Civ., p. 119

17. Tarn, Gks. in B. and I., p. 32

18. Livy, Hist. xxxvii.⁴⁰

19. Strabo, Geography 11.11.1

obtained from India. The loss of Media to Artabanus meant that the Seleucids could no longer draw upon that province for horses. Also, these provinces supplied good soldiers, and although the Seleucids did not make extensive use of Iranian cavalry in foreign wars, they did enroll vast numbers of Asiatics in their armies.

Actually Asiatics had been found in Macedonian armies even during the time of Alexander, although Greeks and Macedonians were considered the elite.²⁰ Satraps of the upper provinces undoubtedly used Iranian troops from the start, and "the Seleucids certainly made plentiful use of them."²¹ As well, the Syrians "drew freely on the mountaineers of the southern highlands" ²²

At Raphia (217) Antiochus III's army counted three Macedonians or Greeks to every four Asiatics; at Magnesia (189) it contained only one soldier of European stock to every two Asiatics.²³

And, writes Parke:

Macedonian armies on eastern service probably filled the gaps in their ranks out of those children of mixed parentage who were born in the camp; but also contingents of non-Macedonians trained in Macedonian arms and probably called Macedonians may have been added. On any other supposition it is hard to explain the continued appearance of large numbers of Macedonians in every army.²⁴

20. Cary, His. of the Gr. World, p. 231

21. Ibid. p. 233

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Parke, Gr. Mercenary Soldiers, p. 209

Not only the royal army suffered because of these rebellions. As well, the royal coffers were not as full as they might be; for "Gold, silver, copper, iron, lead and tin were furnished by several of the provinces and precious stones of various kinds abounded."²⁵ Rostovtzeff, who considered economics as prime cause for the eastern campaign, puts forward an interesting theory. He writes that the early Seleucids regularly coined both gold and silver. The coining of gold, however, ceased in the middle of the third century. This might be explained by the fact that gold is generally quite scarce in the Near East and that

the only abundant sources of gold for the Seleucids were Siberia and the Middle East; (Asia Minor hardly produced much gold at this time). Since Siberian gold reached Bactria first, it was natural that gold currency should be issued in large amounts especially in the Seleucid satrapy of Bactria. As soon as Bactria became independent . . . [and] the Parthians inserted themselves between the Asiatic North [and the Seleucids] , gold became very scarce in the Seleucid kingdom and the kings subsequent to Seleucus II had to give up coinage in that metal. We may, by the way, suppose that the question of the gold supply was one of the reasons for the Oriental expedition of Antiochus III.²⁶

When attempting to determine the motives which lay behind an exploit such as the one now under consideration, those other than political or economic must be examined. Antiochus lived in a time which still vividly remembered the career of the 'divine' Alexander. The careers of others, such as Pyrrhus, would be thought worthy of emulation. Extremely influential as well would be that of Hannibal, a contemporary of Antiochus,

25. Rawlinson, *Parthia*, p. 38

26. Rostovtzeff, *SEH* 1, pp. 446, 447

whose brilliant successes in Italy during the Second Punic War could not help but inflame the ambitions of the young and therefore impressionable king. And Antiochus was undoubtedly possessed of that same spirit of adventure which had spread the Greek tongue and way of life from Spain to the Levant.

Undoubtedly that part of the campaign that was against Parthia and Bactria was prompted by the desire to reconquer these provinces. By recovering these provinces he could salve his pride, restore a great source of income which was lawfully his, reopen his eastern trade routes and put a stop to the secessionist movement which threatened to tear the empire asunder. But after affairs have been settled in these satrapies, Antiochus ceases to be the soldier-king striving to reassert his rightful rule; instead, he becomes nothing more than a royal extortionist. The campaign is no longer a military expedition but a plundering raid; a looting expedition to replenish quickly and easily the royal forces with elephants and the royal coffers with gold, so that the king might continue his duel with Egypt and attempt to regain those lands which he had lost at Raphia. Aside from a desire for plunder, Antiochus may have hoped that such an expedition would be good propaganda for himself, perhaps erasing somewhat the memory of Raphia.

Looking back on the "anabasis", one can see that with the possible exception of Parthia, Antiochus always

departed from a place far richer than when he arrived.

Polybius, as mentioned previously, stated that in Bactria Antiochus accepted all the war elephants of Euthydemus, a most wealthy and worthy acquisition, and as well "liberally" provisioned his army. This was, however, quite within the scope of Antiochus' legitimate interests; for Bactria was a rebel province and the king was merely enjoying the fruits of a land once legally his and now probably a subject ally.

From Bactria the king "retired over the Hindu Kush mountains . . ."²⁷ into lands upon which the Seleucids had held no claim, since Seleucus I had made peace with Chandragupta Maurya almost a century earlier. Here in India, the expedition has lost its military aspect and has taken on a piratical one. According to Polybius, Antiochus renewed the old Seleucid-Maurya friendship. The Indian ruler, Sophagasenus, undoubtedly wished the friendship had never existed, or that the Syrian king had not brought so great a force to renew this bond. As it was, this "renewal" cost the Indian a number of war elephants, and as well forced him to feed and provision the Syrian army. Besides provisions and elephants, Antiochus, on departing, left behind one of his officers to take back the treasure which Sophagasenus had promised to give him.²⁸

27. Frye, Heritage, p. 169

28. Polybius, Histories xi.34

29. Smith, H. of I., p. 211

Leaving India, Antiochus crossed Arachosia, Drangiana and then, after having wintered in Carmania we find him dealing with the Gerrhaeans of Arabia. These people apparently handled all of the Arabian trade and much of the Indian trade as well and were, therefore, of interest to the Seleucids. Since, however, there is no mention of any trouble between Seleucids and Gerrhaeans, it must be assumed that Rostovtzeff is correct when he says that this visit was a show of force intending to "frighten the Gerrhaeans and make them increase the quantity of merchandise that they sent to Seleucia . . ."³⁰ Also, it cannot be assumed that the king was just visiting one of his satrapies, for until this time, Arabia came within the Ptolemaic sphere of influence, not the Seleucid.³¹ Among the Gerrhaeans, Antiochus once again enriched himself. The Gerrhaeans asked that he guarantee their freedom and peace, which he did. In return for this boon the grateful natives gave him a great treasure, or so write Polybius. As was mentioned earlier, I consider that in actual fact it was just the opposite. The king guaranteed the natives their peace and freedom in return for a great treasure.

Therefore, while many motives can be found to explain the eastern campaign, I consider the campaign was undertaken

30. Rostovtzeff, SEH 1, p. 458

31. Ibid. p. 426

primarily for two reasons: first, to recover Bactria and Parthia if it should be possible, and secondly, to plunder as much of the country as possible, whether or not it turned out that Bactria and Parthia could be reconquered.

Although this show of strength may have quelled the ambitions of some satraps who might have revolted, his aim cannot have been simply a show of strength as Rostovtzeff claims.³²

32. See note 2 this chapter.

CHAPTER XI

THE RESULTS OF THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN

It now remains to examine the results of this great campaign. The expedition had no direct effect on the empire as a whole, except to stop temporarily the secessionist movement which the revolts of Bactria and Parthia had engendered. Indirectly, however, the campaign was of great consequence to the Seleucid kingdom. It brought the king to the attention of the Romans, who

saw in him a second Alexander, a conqueror of inordinate ambitions; and deeming him worthy of world empire, they believed he aimed at it.¹

By this I do not mean to imply that the Romans would not have become embroiled with the Seleucids if Antiochus had not made his anabasis. This expedition, however, did make the Romans very aware of Antiochus, and the Romans always had an ingrained fear of great conquerors, especially after their wars with Hannibal. If the eastern march had never been undertaken, it is quite possible that Magnesia would have been postponed for some time. Doubtless, however, Magnesia would have taken place.

The eastern campaign sheds some light on the later Thracian campaign. Thrace had belonged to Lysimachus who had lost it to Seleucus Nicator by virtue of his defeat and death

1. CAH 8, p. 142

at the hands of that monarch at Corupedium in 281 B.C.² Seleucus did not hold it for long, for in the following year he was assassinated by Ptolemy Ceraunus.³ After the death of Seleucus, Thrace reverted to its former independence and dissension. Thus the Thracian and Indian campaigns bear a resemblance in that at both times Antiochus was attempting to recover lands which Seleucus I had once tenuously held for but a short time.

While the expedition seems to have had no direct results on the empire, the provinces of Bactria and Parthia were definitely and directly affected. Although Parthia retained her independence, she caused the Seleucids no further trouble for nearly thirty years. Not until the reign of Arsaces V Phraates did the Parthian resume the aggressive policies of Arsaces II Tiridates. Bactria also kept her independence. Turning her expansionist tendencies eastwards she did not presume to encroach upon Seleucid domains until the power of Antiochus was broken by the Romans at Magnesia. The campaign had no effect whatsoever on the remaining places which were visited. The great majority of the Indians would have never known that he had been there, and indeed he stayed but a short time, only long enough to collect elephants and provisions. In Arabia it was the same. He was merely passing through.

2. CAH 8, p. 186

3. OCD s.v. "Seleucus I"

In his own day, Antiochus, because of this campaign was extremely well-known.

The tale of his distant exploits, embroidered and magnified by his mercenaries, notably the Aetolians, filled the Hellenic world, until the end of the third century, Antiochus enjoyed, as no one else, the admiration of the Greeks.⁴

He would have been a well-known historical personage even today had he not been so overshadowed by his far greater contemporary, Hannibal.

4. CAH 3, p. 142

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION.

In writing this thesis I have attempted to show how and why Antiochus made his eastern campaign, a campaign which took him east as far as India, north into Hyrcania and south to Arabia.

This campaign was undertaken because of revolts of Bactria and Parthia. These in turn were the result of several causes. The Seleucids had always shown little interest in their eastern domains, being ever engrossed in the affairs of the west. And in their dealings with their eastern subjects the Seleucids made no attempt either to understand the people or to lessen for them the disgrace of being conquered. They did not, unlike Alexander, realize that without Iranian participation their empire could not and would not endure. It was from this lack of understanding and communication that the revolt of Parthia stemmed. The Bactrian revolt was the result of those same causes which had triggered the Parthian rebellion and, as well, of the knowledge that the constant nomadic incursions of northern barbarians could be better combatted from Zariaspa than from Antioch or even Seleucia. Therefore, in Bactria, self-defense more than resurgent Iranian nationalism was the spark which touched off revolt. As well as showing why these provinces rebelled and, therefore, why Antiochus marched east, an attempt has been made to give

the actual history of that campaign.

While the expedition was necessitated by secession, the campaign was more than one of reconquest. The king certainly attempted to reconquer these two provinces but found it expedient to recognize their rulers as client kings. In addition he indemnified himself by considerable amounts of plunder. The march into India however, was not one of reconquest or even one of conquest but merely a foray for loot. Of the same nature was the Gerrhaean expedition. Antiochus visited Arabia only for plunder, and to force those people into shipping a greater quantity of their merchandise to Seleucid ports.

Lastly, an attempt has been made to show the effects of this campaign on the provinces, on the empire, and on the world. The expedition did not change anything in any appreciable way. Both Bactria and Parthia retained that independence which they had won for themselves some forty years earlier in the reign of Antiochus II Theos. All the campaign accomplished was to show these provinces that the power of Syria was yet one to be reckoned with, and to a limited extent, to reduce their military strength. As a result they did not attempt to encroach upon the remaining Seleucid territory until the power which Antiochus had shown them was crushed at Magnesia, and until their own power had been regained.

The expedition put an end to the secessionist trend in the eastern provinces of the empire which had been engendered by the successful and hitherto uncontested revolts

of Bactria and Parthia. Thus it was possible for the Seleucids to hold their empire together for a little longer. This respite was, however, short; for all the Iranian provinces fell away from Seleucid overlordship as soon as the resurgent Parthian power made it possible.

In the eyes of the world, the eastern campaign made Antiochus the most famous man in the Greek world. He was considered the greatest conqueror of his time but this unfortunately brought him to the notice of the rising young giant in the west, Rome. Rome, having just defeated Hannibal, had a healthy fear of great conquerors, and so feared lest Antiochus turn west. It was a combination of Roman fear of Antiochus, spawned by his eastern expedition and the western ambitions of the Seleucid king, i.e. the desire to recover the Chersonese and the coastal towns of Thrace, which led to that monarch's defeat in the Roman victory at Magnesia.

Therefore, while the campaign of Antiochus was the marvel of the time and indeed for some time to come, it was of little lasting significance. Although it brought the Seleucid name into the foreground and dissuaded the ambitions of other satraps who were perhaps contemplating revolt, the disintegration of the empire was checked for no great length of time. After the Romans had shattered the power of Antiochus at Magnesia, the empire once again began to collapse.

APPENDIX A

THE ARSACIDAE

Arsaces I	ca. 250 -	248 B.C. ¹
Arsaces II Tiridates	248 -	211 B.C. ¹
Arsaces III Artabanus	211 -	?

1. HCD (Arsaces), p. 133

APPENDIX B

THE SELEUCIDAE

Seleucus I Nicator	312 - 280 B.C. ¹
Antiochus I Soter	280 - 261 B.C. ²
Antiochus II Theos	261 - 246 B.C. ²
Seleucus II Callinicus	246 - 226 B.C. ³
Seleucus III Ceraunus	226 - 223 B.C. ³
Antiochus III the Great	223 - 187 B.C. ⁴

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1. HCD s.v. "Seleucus", p. 1436
 2. HCD s.v. "Antiochus" p. 85
 3. HCD s.v. "Seleucus" p. 1437
 4. HCD s.v. "Antiochus" p. 85

APPENDIX C

A NOTE ON SOURCES

The major source for this campaign is Polybius. In Book v, Chapters 42 - 54 he deals with the revolt of Molon and Alexander. Book vii deals with Antiochus' expedition to Armenia, and Books x, xi, and xiii deal with the eastern campaign. There are also several minor sources. Strabo, in Books ix and xi, deals with the nomadic peoples of the north, sometimes in connection with the eastern campaign of Antiochus. Justin, xli.5, deals with the death of Arsaces I, and the Fragments of Arrian at one point also comment on Arsaces. Livy, xxxvii.40, mentions the number of Median horse present at Magnesia with Antiochus.

The evidence is limited. A search of Jacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker revealed nothing, as did a perusal of the Reports of the French Archaeological Expedition in Afghanistan. It was merely a survey. Persian and Indian sources have nothing to say. None of the standard works gives a really adequate treatment of the period. Consequently, the material still remains primarily Polybius and, to a lesser extent, Strabo. A great desideratum is adequate archaeological excavation in Persia and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to occur in the immediate future for a number of political reasons.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE A

THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN OF SELEUCUS II CALLINICUS

- 241 B.C. The Laodicean War is finished.¹
- 240/39 Seleucus now turns to recover Asia Minor from his brother Antiochus Hierax. The king invades Lydia but fails to take Sardis.²
- 238 Seleucus attacks Mithridates of Pontus, an ally of Hierax.³
- 235 Antiochus Hierax defeats Seleucus at Ancyra.⁴
- Now Tiridates takes advantage of the civil war raging in the Seleucid lands and the king's recent defeat at the hands of his brother to take Hyrcania, probably 235.
- On learning the above, Seleucus "immediately" proceeds east. He makes common cause with the Bactrian monarch Diodotus I and Tiridates flees north, probably 234.
- Tiridates did not spend much time in the north, however, for Diodotus I soon died and the Parthian was successful in winning over the new Bactrian king, Diodotus II.
- Following this scheme of events puts the death of Diodotus I at 234 or more probably 233.

1. CAH 7, p. 720

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.


4. Botsford, Hellenic History, p. 304

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE B

THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN OF ANTIOCHUS III

- 211/10 B.C. Antiochus sets out down the Euphrates.¹
- 210 The king is in Media making preparations for his expedition.²
- 209 The royal force marches out from Ecbatana.³
- 209-08 The Parthian Campaign.⁴
- 208 Antiochus and Arbatanus make peace.⁵
- 208-06 The Bactrian Campaign.⁶
- 206 Antiochus and Euthydemus make peace.⁷
- 206 The Indian Episode, followed by the march through Arachosia, Drangiana, and Carmania.⁸
- 206/05 The king winters in Carminia.⁹
- 205 The Gerrhaean Affair.¹⁰
- 205/04 Antiochus arrives in Seleucia.¹¹

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1. CAH 8, p. 140
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 141
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.,
9. Ibid., p. 142
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.



PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES
ANTIOCHUS' CAMPAIGN → X →



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